Guam Targeted First Night: Navy ISSUES ‘Insurance Policy’

U.S. Navy patch with black-and-white American flag.

The Pentagon is betting America’s undersea edge on a new “insurance policy” in Australia—because Guam could be a first-night target if China ever moves on Taiwan.

Quick Take

The U.S. Navy plans to rotate up to four Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines through HMAS Stirling near Perth starting in 2027.
Australia is investing roughly $5.6 billion in base upgrades and another $9 billion in a nearby Henderson maintenance/shipbuilding facility to support the mission.
U.S. officials and analysts describe Stirling as a safer, faster “return-to-fight” option than Guam if forward bases face missile attack.
A 2025 visit by USS Vermont tested joint maintenance work, a key proof point for the broader plan.

Why HMAS Stirling Matters in a Pacific Fight

U.S. Navy planning described in recent reporting centers on HMAS Stirling in Western Australia as a repair-and-sustainment hub for nuclear-powered Virginia-class submarines. The plan calls for rotational deployments beginning in 2027, with as many as four U.S. boats cycling through the base. The strategic logic is simple: submarines are only decisive if they can be maintained, re-armed, and returned to patrol quickly during a high-end conflict.

Rear Adm. Lincoln Reifsteck, who commands a U.S. submarine group involved in the effort, emphasized the geographic advantage—getting capabilities “back to it faster” if war breaks out. HMAS Stirling’s location near Perth places it closer to Indo-Pacific flashpoints than Hawaii or the U.S. mainland, while still being harder for Chinese missiles to reach than Guam. That combination aims to improve U.S. resilience if Beijing targets forward bases early.

From Port Visits to a Real Maintenance “Haven”

The distinction in this plan is permanence. Prior submarine port calls and short rotations do not solve the hardest wartime problem: major repairs and maintenance capacity close enough to matter. The reporting describes a growing maintenance precinct at Stirling and the possibility of contingency dry-docking by the early 2030s. Analysts quoted in the coverage argue this matters because dry dock access can determine whether a damaged submarine returns to operations—or disappears from the fight.

That matters even more because U.S. shipyards have faced maintenance backlogs, making long transits for repairs costly in time and readiness. The 2025 four-week visit by USS Vermont is presented as an early operational test of U.S.-Australian maintenance coordination. The point was not symbolism; it was learning whether a U.S. boat can get meaningful work done with allied facilities and personnel, then safely return to duty.

AUKUS, Interoperability, and the Price Tag Australia Is Paying

The Stirling plan sits inside the AUKUS framework announced in 2021, which links the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia in deeper defense integration, including Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Under the timeline described in the research, Australia is expected to begin acquiring Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s. That means today’s infrastructure, training, and procedures are also building Australia’s future capability—while binding allied forces more tightly together.

Australia’s spending underscores how serious the commitment is. The research cites $5.6 billion for Stirling upgrades—housing, a training center, a submarine pier, power, and a radioactive waste facility—plus another $9 billion for a Henderson maintenance and shipbuilding facility. Those are big-ticket projects in a region where labor competes with a mining-heavy economy, raising practical questions about workforce and timelines. The available reporting flags those hurdles, but does not show a policy reversal.

Deterrence Benefits—And the Hard Questions Voters Should Ask

Strategically, the concept aims to complicate Beijing’s planning by denying an easy “single point of failure” for U.S. undersea forces. Mike Green of the United States Studies Centre is quoted calling the posture a “no-brainer” and describing Stirling as a protected “bastion” compared with more exposed locations. Analysts Bryan Clark and Brent Sadler similarly focus on whether Australia can field the dry-dock and overhaul capacity that turns a forward base into a true wartime lifeline.

For Americans who care about constitutional government and accountability, the key is oversight and clarity, not slogans. The sources describe a real-world shift toward distributed basing, enabled in part by allied spending and political alignment. What remains less clear from the reporting is the full U.S. cost, how quickly the maintenance backlog at home can be relieved, and how nuclear-support responsibilities—like waste handling—will be governed in a partner nation still building nuclear-sub experience.

The U.S. Navy’s New Insurance Policy for War With China Is an Australian Base:
Pentagon plans to deploy submarines to an expanding facility in allies’ strategy to deter Beijing. https://t.co/83TsaClVju

— Young H. D. Kim (@Young70587) February 9, 2026

The bottom line is that the Navy and its allies are treating sustainment as deterrence. If the United States can keep submarines repaired, armed, and moving in the Indo-Pacific—despite missile threats and strained shipyards—that strengthens stability by raising the costs of aggression. The reporting also shows this effort is already moving from concept to execution, with 2025 maintenance trials completed and 2027 deployments penciled in as the next major milestone.